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Abstract
In this paper we consider a scheme for cryptographic key distribution based on a variation of
continuous variable quantum key distribution called central broadcast. In the continuous
variable central broadcast scheme, security arises from discord present in the Hanbury Brown
and Twiss effect from a thermal source. The benet of this scheme is that it expands the range
of frequencies into the microwave regime. Longer wavelengths—where the thermal photon
number is higher and correlations remain robust over long distances—may even be preferable
to optical wavelengths. Assuming that Alice controls the source but not the distribution of the
light (e.g. satellite broadcasts), then we demonstrate that the central broadcast scheme is robust
to an entangling cloner attack. We establish the security of the protocol both experimentally
and theoretically.
Keywords: central broadcast, thermal states, microwave, quantum discord, quantum key
distribution
(Some gures may appear in colour only in the online journal)
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is rapidly gaining
widespread acceptance [1] as a method of secure key exchange
and several high bandwidth devices have been demonstrated.
However, the connection between the core network and the
edge devices remains a weak link. For the end user, wire-
less access is the ideal use model. The user interface must be
both inexpensive and accessible without compromising secu-
rity and maintaining the ability to work on scales of the order
of metres to tens of metres.
Recently, the potential of thermal states for QKD has been
established [2, 3]. Although thermal states have sometimes
been described as too noisy [4, 5], they exhibit HanburyBrown
and Twiss correlations which have been found to exhibit
positive discord [6], a necessary condition for QKD [7].
Consider a central broadcast protocol in which the radi-
ation is split between two parties, who now have correlated
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signals from which they can build a key. A typical central
broadcast scheme is shown on gure 1. Another advantage to
using thermal states is that they are easy and low-cost to pro-
duce. Whereas large-scale implementations of QKD such as
those described above require specic infrastructure, thermal
states central broadcasting protocols can be implemented over
short distances, with low-power devices.
In the scheme proposed in [2], a thermal source is incident
on a beamsplitter, with one output port connected to Alice and
the other to Bob. Alice controls the source, the beamsplitter
and the channels from the source to their detector, via the split-
ter. The eavesdropper is limited to the channel leading from
the splitter to Bob and therefore, has an equal rank to Bob.
We found that there is both a positive key rate and positive
discord between the legal parties, both at optical frequencies
(experimental result) and microwave frequencies (theoretical
analysis).
In the present paper, as illustrated in gure 2, Alice and Eve
switch places, giving Eve control of the higher level channel.
This providesEve with greater knowledge of the states making
up the thermal radiation. She can intercept and resend bunched
pairs at her leisure, pairs which are indistinguishable from
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Figure 1. In this situation, a satellite beams down a signal, which is
received by Alice, Bob and Eve. Eve can have a very large portion
of the signal, but she does not control the signal being emitted.
Figure 2. This is the schematic for this iteration of the protocol. A
combination half-wave plate λ/2 and polarising beamsplitter is used
to make a variable transmittance beamsplitter. Part of the signal is
transmitted to Eve, and the other part goes through the same
assembly to split between Alice and Bob. Having variable
beamsplitters is especially important so that we can check the
security of the protocol even if most of the signal is detected by Eve.
Each signal is detected with photodiodes, and the signal is fed to the
oscilloscope via the analog to digital converters for data collection.
those radiated by the source. Fortunately, the security of a cen-
tral broadcast protocol naturally arises from the correlations
within the pairs. Their origin itself is irrelevant. As a result,
the protocol allows for quantum secure key to be distributed,
even with Eve on the superior channel.
In the following, we describe the protocol and its modelling
in more details.We use an optical experiment so that the eaves-
dropper channel is uncluttered by extraneous sources of noise.
In microwave, it becomes difcult to differentiate Eve from all
other sources of noises. The optical regime is the model of the
perfect microwave experiment. Then we allow higher levels of
noise in the theoretical modelling.
1. Protocol
This protocol is illustrated in gure 1. A source (for instance
a trusted satellite) emits thermal radiation which is picked by
the legal parties and the eavesdropper. We can consider that
Eve can access quite a large portion of the signal, intercepting
much of what should go to Alice and Bob. We model this by
giving Eve an entangling cloner, so she can divert as much of
the signal to her as convenient. However, we consider that the
source is trusted; this means that the eavesdropper does not use
the satellite to relay her own signal.
We express the protocol formally as follows:
• Alice creates a beam from a trusted thermal source.
• On the way to their trusted beamsplitter with transmit-
tance η2, the signal is interfered with by Eve, via an
entangling cloner denoted η1.
• Alice uses η2 to divert part of the signal to her detector
and send the rest on to Bob.
• Similarly to [2], the bunched nature of the pairs com-
ing out of η1 means that uctuations present at Alice’s
detector are correlated with those at Bob’s detector.
• To derive their data, Alice and Bob slice these uctuations
as convenient; as an example, a uctuation above themean
could be a 1 and a uctuation below the mean, a 0.
• Like any QKD scheme, our protocol requires quantum
correlations. To conrm that the signal from Alice and
Bob are correlated is done through verifying the ther-
mal nature of their signal. Thus, Alice sends Bob small
chunks of data for him to perform a g(2)(0) calculation. A
g(2)(0) > 1 means that the signal is thermal.
• Alice and Bob now have a stream of independent and ran-
domly correlated bits from which they can derive a key,
the security of which they can improve with cascade and
advantage distillation, as per any QKD scheme.
This scheme was implemented as shown in gure 2. A ther-
mal source shines onto a beamsplitter which is controlled by
the eavesdropper and therefore, allows her to capture as much
of the signal as she wants. This is the same situation as that
described in gure 1, where the eavesdropper can receive most
of the signal, but does not control the source. In order to simu-
late high levels of noise, we consider two attenuator channels
between η2 and the legal parties, equivalent to adding a beam-
splitter of transmittance η3 between η2 and Alice (η4 for Bob),
with an input state of variance N3 (and N4) at the second input
arm.
Once again, this is not a prepare-and-send scheme. Alice
controls the source, but the process of splitting pairs happening
at the beamsplitter is stochastic, therefore unpredictable. Eve
has no access to the channels between η2 and either Alice or
Bob, nor any control over their detectors.
Maurer andWolf [8] have proved a theorem providing con-
ditions to be satised for a scheme such as ours to be secure.
The theorem reads as follows:
[quote]
Theorem 1. In scenario 1, the following conditions are
equivalent:
(a) I(A : B|E) > 0
(b) K(A : B ‖ E) > 0
(c) I(A : B ↓ E) > 0
[end quote] [16] where K(A : B ‖ E) is the secret key rate.
The third condition is actually the most restrictive. I(A : B ↓ E)
is the intrinsic conditional mutual information; it determines
2
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the unreducible amount of conditional mutual information
between Alice and Bob, regardless of any attempts by Eve at
acquiring more information through local operations; in other
words, it is information inaccessible to Eve. Furthermore, it
satises
I(A : B↓E) < I(A : B|E),
which makes it a tighter condition on the secret key rate.
We can see its relation to the quantum discord if we recall
that the latter, D(B|A), is dened as the difference between
the mutual information I(A : B) and the classical mutual infor-
mation J(B|A) (or J(A|B)). I(A : B) quanties all possible cor-
relations between Alice and Bob, but J(B|A) quanties those
measured by local operations at Alice’s andBob’s sites. There-
fore, it can be understood as the intrinsic conditional mutual
information as described previously. Let us therefore, rewrite
the theorem as:
Theorem 2. In our central broadcast scheme, the following
conditions are equivalent:
(a) I(A : B|E) > 0
(b) K(A : B ‖ E) > 0
(c) D(B|A) > 0
It is therefore enough in principle, to demonstrate that either
condition is satised.We shall however, prove two, namely the
positivity of the conditionalmutual information and that of the
discord. The latter will allow us to demonstrate the quantum
nature of the secrecy.
1.1. Theoretical modelling
Let us recall that thermal states can be modelled using Gaus-
sian statistics, which makes them easily dened and manip-
ulated through their rst and second moments [9, 10]. The
former are contained in the displacement vector 〈r̂〉, where
r̂ is the system’s operator, and ρ the state’s density operator.
The second moments are contained in the covariance matrix γ
dened as
γi j = Tr
[
ρ {(r̂i − 〈r̂i〉), (r̂ j − 〈r̂ j〉)} ρ
]
,
where we write the anti-commutator using {}. A thermal
state has covariance matrix γin = 2(n̄+ 1)I, where n̄ is the
average photon number and I the 2× 2 identity matrix, and
null displacement. We consider single mode states, which is
appropriate since we consider narrowband detectors.









where ηi is the transmittance and µi =
√
1− ηi represents the
noise. They act on the state as γout = VγinV
T.
The input state at the rst beamsplitter contains the ther-
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rin = (xs; ps; xe; pe)
T,
where (V xs ,V
p
s , xs, ps) are the source parameters and
(V xe ,V
p
e , xe, pe) the eavesdropper’s. The variances are given in
shot noise units (SNU).We note the structure of the covariance
matrix as γ in = γsource ⊕ γEve. The two empty sub-matrices
would represent potential pre-existing correlations between
the source and Eve, which in our set-up, is unrealistic.
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where γout is the state at the output of η2, the rst block sub-
matrix is the input state at η3 and the last sub-matrix, the input
state at η4.








Γ̃v Γ̃va Γ̃ve Γ̃vb ˜Γvv′
Γ̃va Γ̃a Γ̃ea Γ̃ab ˜Γav′
Γ̃ve Γ̃ea Γ̃e Γ̃eb Γ̃ev′
Γ̃vb Γ̃ab Γ̃eb Γ̃b ˜Γbv′







where the block sub-matrices are given in the appendix A.
The mutual information I(A : B) is given by
I(A : B) = S(Γa)+ S(Γb)− S(Γab),
where S(x) is the von Neumann entropy and Γi the covari-
ance matrices of A, B and AB respectively. The von Neumann
























where xi are the symplectic eigenvalues of Γ. The conditional
mutual information is
I(A : B|E) = S(Γae)+ S(Γbe)− S(Γe)− S(Γabe).
The discord is dened explicitly as
D(B|A) = S(Γa)− S(Γab)+min
Γ0
S(Γb|xA)
where Γb|xA is the covariance matrix of B conditioned by a
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Figure 3. Conditional mutual information for thermal states (left) versus coherent states (right). We can see that when η1 → 1, so when
there is no amount of Eve coming between the legal parties, the conditional mutual information peaks.
Figure 4. We plot a numerical simulation of the conditional mutual
information I(A : B|E) against η1, with η2 = 0.5, η3 = η4 = 0.2 and
ǫ3 = ǫ4 = 10
−2. Using the Bose–Einstein distribution at 30GHz
and T = 300K, the input photon number is n̄ = 1309. At η2 = 0.5,
Alice and Bob share equal part of the signal.
homodyne measurement on A [11]






and ()−1 the pseudo-inverse.
2. Results and discussion
The protocol was realised experimentally, as described on
gure 2. The thermal source is provided by a superlumines-
cent diode coupled to an external cavity, making it a tuneable
laser, run without any added modulation. The laser can be run
separately in coherent or in thermal mode, and the thermal-
ity of the source was established in [2]. The source bandwidth
was measured at ∆λ = 0.4 nm spread around a centre wave-
length of λ0 = 780.09 nm; this give a coherence time of τ c =
4.8 ps. The detectors are ThorLabs Det36A photodiodes with
a bandwidth of 25MHz, coupled to a LeCroyWaverunner 44xi
oscilloscope of bandwidth 400MHz; the combined integration
time is 14 ns and the oscilloscope samples at 5 GSps. Thermal
states are correlated in amplitudes, which can be measured in
terms of the strength of the electric eld and therefore, single
photon detectors are not necessary.
The conditional mutual information is calculated from
the sliced data strings using Shannon entropies H(x)
= −∑ p(x)log(p(x)) in terms of the measured frequencies
p(x).
Figure 3 shows that the scheme works experimentally as
predicted. I(A : B|E) is best as η1 tends to 1, and at η2 = 0.5,
so whenAlice andBob gets equal shares ofmost of the thermal
source signal. This corresponds to a situation where the eaves-
dropper is absent, and where there is minimal loss. As long
as the η1 > 0.5, the eavesdropper gets little of the signal and
the advantage is to the legal parties. However, no matter how
much signal Eve receives, the conditional mutual information
is always positive, and never exhibits a sharp fall-off, typical
of point-to-point schemes over the 3dB limit. This means that
it is always possible to build key, albeit slowly. The key can
be built from the data distributed using reconciliation schemes
such as advantage distillation [12] and cascade [13].
Figure 3 allows us also to illustrate that this scheme can-
not work in the coherent regime. As mentioned before in [2],
coherent radiation is not bunched; therefore, it holds none of
the intrinsic correlations contained in bunched pairs. There is
no splitting of pairs occurring at the beamsplitters, because
there are no such pairs; single photons travel through uncor-
related to Alice and Bob, who as a result can build no key
from them. This is shown on the right-hand graph of the gure
I(A : B|E) remains constant, no matter how much Eve lets
through, no matter the split between Alice and Bob.
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Figure 5. We plot a numerical simulation of the discord D(B|A)
against η1, with η2 = 0.5, η3 = η4 = 0.2 and ǫ3 = ǫ4 = 10
−2 and
initial photon number n̄ = 1309.
Let us now compare these results to those obtained through
our theoretical modelling.
Figure 4 shows the behaviour of the conditional mutual
information as Eve lets more and more of the signal through.
When compared with gure 3, we can see that as η1 → 1, so
as the amount of Eve’s signal vanishes, I(A : B|E) increases.
The simulations obtained through our theoretical modelling
match the experimental results. Furthermore, I(A : B|E) is
always positive, so by virtue of our theorem, there is always
secrecy.
We can also explore how the initial state of Eve inuences
the secrecy between Alice and Bob. For that, we vary Ve and
see that as it increases, I(A : B|E) increases also. The reason
for this, we have mentioned before and will detail further in
the lines below.
Figure 5 illustrates the positivity of the discord, regard-
less of η1. This means that there always are quantum cor-
relations between Alice and Bob. This satises the third of
the conditions from our theorem, and we can afrm quantum
secrecy.
What is remarkable is the value of the discord when η1 is
null, so before Eve begins to let the source signal through. In
this case, what is actually measured is the amount of quan-
tum correlations within Eve’s state. We have seen that the
higher Ve is, the higher I(A : B|E), but here we see that the dis-
cord follows a similar trend. This is particularly evident when
Ve = 250SNU.
This is a result of the physics of thermal states and the
reason why this scheme is secure even under Eve’s intercept-
and-resend. To understand this, let us step back and consider a
single beamsplitter (input arms labelled 1 and 2, output arms
labelled 3 and 4) with a thermal state at one input, as shown in
gure 6.
Since it is bunched, there will be correlated photon
pairs travelling into the beamsplitter. If both photons travel
Figure 6. On this gure, we see a bunched pair arriving at one input
arm of the beamsplitter, and the possible outputs: P(23, 04), P(03, 24)
or P(13, 14). We show only one possible way to split the pair (photon
2 on arm 4 and photon 1 on arm 3) but the converse is obviously
possible.
into the same input (say arm 1), we can expect three
outputs [14]:
• both photons are travelling through on arm 3 P(23, 04),
• both photons travel onto arm 4 P(03, 24) or
• one photon for each arm P(13, 14).
This corresponds to Eve inputting a vacuum or a coherent
state at arm 2 and why we can in fact equate her to any loss in
the channel.
On the other hand, if Eve inputs a thermal state as well,
there is now a correlated pair of photons travelling into each
input arm. This is illustrated in gure 7. This will gives us the
following outputs:P(43, 04), P(03, 44), P(23, 24), P(33, 14), and
P(13, 34). The third case P(23, 24), is three-degenerate; either
both pairs get to the other side in one piece (which accounts for
two degeneracies) or both pairs are split (the remaining degen-
eracy). This means that accounting for all possible outcomes,
there are only two cases where there will not be at least one
correlated pair travelling into η2 to Alice and Bob: either one
pair is split at η1 and Eve gets three photons P(33, 14) (mit-
igated by the fact that Eve would choose to let most of the
signal through at η1 in order not to be noticed) or both pairs
are split at η1, which is one of the P(23, 24) degeneracies.
If Ve = 1SNU, then Eve inputs a vacuum state, and Alice
and Bob build key solely from the pairs produced at the source.
As a result, the discord is minimal at η1 → 0. If Ve > 1SNU,
Eve’s state can be regarded as thermal; in this case, she con-
tributes pairs to those coming from the source. In fact, if the
eavesdropper’s input is too signicant, the legal parties can
build a quantum secure key, regardless of how much signal
is coming from the source. As in any QKD, we expect that the
eavesdropper will try to minimise her input, if only to escape
detection. At best, she can hope to merely ‘listen’ in, in which
case, her input is Ve = 1SNU. Yet, as soon as signal begins
going through (η1 > 0.1), the legal parties can build a quantum
secure key, albeit slowly.
Let us point out that these plots have been obtained for very
high level of noise on Alice’s and Bob’s branches. Indeed η3
and η4 are such that 80% of their signal is lost. Yet, even in this
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Figure 7. This time, one bunched pair arrives at each arm of the
beamsplitter, leading to the possible outputs: P(43, 04), P(03, 44),
P(23, 24), P(33, 14), and P(13, 34). On can see that the P(23, 24)
output can be arrived at either by splitting each input pair, or
transmitting them intact.
case, the legal parties are able to construct a quantum secure
key.
3. Concluding remarks
In our previous work, we demonstrated that a central broad-
cast protocol using thermal states is quantum secure. In the
presentwork,we allowed the eavesdropper to access the higher
channel and thus, to have more power and control over the
signal than either of the legal parties. She can intercept and
resend photons pairs at will, and she can hide in the noise
effectively. However,we nd that the conditionalmutual infor-
mation I(A : B|E) is always positive, which means that Alice
and Bob are able to build a secret key from their signal. Fur-
thermore, the discord D(B|A) is also always positive, so the
secret key is quantum secure.
This protocol is secure as long as Alice and Bob have corre-
lated pairs, which they show by checking that their g(2)(0) > 1.
As we have explained, the origin of the pairs itself (either
the source or the eavesdropper) makes no difference to there
being secrecy. The quantum discord shows that there are
always correlations between Alice and Bob, even under Eve’s
inuence.
This is the strength of this scheme. Even if Eve succeeds
in hiding in the noise, if her input is not either vacuum or a
perfect coherent state, she will contribute correlations to the
pool which Alice and Bob can build key from, but she cannot
know when or if these injected states have contributed to the
key. Another option for Eve is to actually become the source;
we explore this in a forthcoming publication.
This experimentwas carried out at optical frequencies using
a pseudo thermal source, however, the theoretical modelling
was performed at values of n̄ consistent with the microwave
regime. Interferometers used in radio astronomy rely on the
presence of thermal correlations being preserved over astro-
nomical distances, and the results in this paper suggest that the
results are highly portable to the microwave regime. Hence,
this method of key exchange appears to be a viable option for
long distance key exchange.
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Appendix A. Protocol 2
A.1. After η2








































































































A.2. After η3 and η4
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